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 1 
Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: 
Mobilisations in the Shadow of European Court of Human Rights 
religious freedom jurisprudence1 
 
Abstract: Over the last twenty years the European Court of Human Rights 
has evolved into a conspicuous, often contentious, force in the multilevel 
battles over the place of religion in the European public sphere. In light of 
scholarly debates questioning the direct effects of courts on the issues they 
address, this paper explores how the nature and extent of European juridical 
influence on religious pluralism are better understood through developments 
taking place ‘in the shadow’ of the Court. Specifically, what is the aftermath 
of the Court’s religion jurisprudence in terms of its applications at the 
grassroots level? And how might legal and political elites operating at the 
national and international levels influence the Court’s engagement with 
religion? These questions are important because ECtHR case law will shape, 
to a large extent, both local and national case law and – less conspicuously 
but no less importantly – grassroots developments in the promotion of or 
resistance to religious pluralism. The latter will, in turn, influence the future 
of the ECtHR caseload. 
 
The European public square has, in the last twenty years and increasingly so, been 
inundated with controversies and debates broadly conceived around the place of 
religion in the public sphere. In spite of (and, some would argue, because of) popular 
and scholarly expectations of religion’s retreat in Europe, issues such as freedom of 
religious expression, freedom of speech versus protection against blasphemy, and the 
public display of religious symbols loom large in the workplace, in schools, in media 
coverage, etc. throughout Europe, at the local, national, and supranational level. The 
presence of Islam in Europe has acted as a catalyst in many debates on religion in 
Europe, but these debates have now grown to encompass much broader assumptions 
about the nature of religious communities, their relationship to state institutions, and 
the place of minority religious communities in society. In short, the debates have                                                         
1 This research is supported by a grant from the European Research Council. I would like to thank the 
research team in the Grassrootsmobilise programme for their insights contributed during discussions of 
an earlier version of this text. 
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come to encompass the place, role and rights of the ‘Christian majority’ (however 
passively and vicariously Christian it may be in most of Europe) in relation to a 
plurality of minority religions that are present in Europe. It is against this backdrop of 
shifting attitudes towards religion-state relations and multitude of Christian, Muslim, 
secular, and otherwise non-religious voices, that the European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence on religion issues has emerged to add its own voice. 
 
And it is a powerful voice: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, or the 
Court), through its role defending the rights enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), has evolved into ‘the most effective transnational human 
rights institution on earth’.2 It has become a quasi-constitutional court for 
approximately 800,000 million individuals residing in the 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe3, under which auspices the Convention was adopted. The European 
Court of Human Rights is now an arena where some of the most challenging debates 
around European religious pluralism take place, and its case law has centrally 
contributed to shaping the terms of such controversies. The latter to the extent that the 
Court may be considered to be in the process of developing a ‘theory’ on the proper 
place of religion in the public sphere4: a process observed by some,5 welcomed by 
others,6 and criticised by yet others.7 The Court increasingly deals with matters 
                                                        
2 W. Cole Durham and David. Kirkham, 'Introduction' in Islam, Europe, and Emerging Legal Issues, 
ed. W. C. Durham, D Kirkham, and C. Scott, Farnham/Burlington (VT: Ashgate, 2012) 1-18, 2. 
3 Matthias Koenig, 'Governance of Religious Diversity at the ECHR' in Jane Bolden and Will 
Kymlincka (eds), International Approaches to the Governance of Ethnic Diversity, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
4 Julie Ringelheim, 'Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of Human Rights in 
Search of a Theory?' in Lorenzo Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds) Law, State and Religion in the New 
Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 283-306. 
5 Koenig (n. 3).  
6 Susanna Mancini, 'The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty' European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 6 no. 1 (2010) 6–27. 
7 Malcolm Evans, 'Freedom of Religion and the European Convention on Human Rights: approaches, 
Trends and Tensions' in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans, and Zoe Robinson (eds) Law and Religion in 
 3 
touching a nerve of European Christian, Muslim, secular and atheistic publics alike, 
with its decisions regarding their ‘national’ rights to display a crucifix in public 
schools (Italy); its engagement with the right to wear the crucifix while working for a 
state-run airline (UK); and its refusal to engage with resistances to ‘the proliferation’ 
of religious architectural structures such as minarets (Switzerland), amongst many 
others. Thus its voice is also a contentious one. The latter is exacerbated by the 
variable ‘margin of appreciation’ it allows individual states on religion issues,8 
particularly when concerning Islam.9 
 
At the heart of this subject matter is the current juxtaposition of: the extreme state of 
flux currently characterising the place of religion in the European sphere, both at the 
European and national level and thus also instigating major crises of identity as the 
Christian component of the latter both nationally and supranationally is being (and has 
been, for a very long time) challenged by secularisation (with ‘Islam’ as a real or 
perceived factor in this); intense negotiations of religion-state relations in the light of 
the above (where minority religions are pursuing their religious freedoms and, in 
many cases, majority religions are fighting to maintain the status quo of their 
privileged positions); and a European institution (the ECtHR) increasingly passing 
judgements related to religion-state relations and the place of religion in the public 
sphere, both because of and in spite of all of the above. The latter makes the ECtHR 
an important space to be watched by scholars studying the palace of religion in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Theoretical and Historical Context, Reissue edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
291 – 315. 
8 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
9 Jeremy Gunn, 'Religious Symbols in Public Schools: The Islamic Headscarf and the European Court 
of Human Rights Decision in Sahin v. Turkey'  in W. Cole Durham, D. Kirkham, and C. Scott (eds) 
Islam, Europe, and Emerging Legal Issue  (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2012) 111–46. 
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public sphere. The impact of the Court’s decisions, in terms of their implementation 
(or non) at the national and local level is one critical dimension.  
 
Another, thus far unexplored, dimension is how the Court’s decisions define the 
‘political opportunity structures’ and the discursive frameworks within which citizens 
act. What is the aftermath of the Court’s religion jurisprudence, in terms of its 
applications (beyond but also including its implementation) at the local and national 
level? Do the Court’s judgements serve as a platform for mobilisations at the local and 
national level in favour of rights won at the ECtHR level? These questions are 
important because ECtHR case law will shape, to a large extent, both local and 
national level case law and – less conspicuously but no less importantly – grassroots 
developments in the promotion of or resistance to religious pluralism. Both the latter 
will, in turn, influence the future of the ECtHR caseload. 
 
Also critical to the Court’s engagement with religious pluralism is ‘grasstops’ 
mobilisation, in terms of direct and indirect lobbying of the Court by legal and 
political elites operating at the national and international levels. Increasingly we also 
find transnational legal activism influencing the Court on matters of religion 
(particularly conspicuously from the United States to the European context). Thus a 
firm grasp of the Court’s role, mediated and/or direct, in relation to religion requires 
attention also to the ‘geography of judicialisation of religion’. 
  
The underlying premise of the present paper is that such mobilisations, at local, 
national and international level (i.e., at the grassroots and grasstops, as it were), are 
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one place we need to look to understand directions in religious pluralism in the 
European setting.  
 
Scholarly interest in the ECHR and the Court outside the discipline of law has surged 
and a growing number of studies have explored the reception and impact of the 
Convention and the ECtHR at the national level,10 the domestic implementation and 
impact of the ECtHR’s judgements both on legal and policy change, and on social 
mobilization11 as well as the influence of such judgements over the policy formation 
and change.12 However, this literature has not dealt specifically with the Court’s 
jurisprudence on religion.  
 
Meanwhile, a vast body of incisive scholarship offers critical analyses of the Court’s 
religious freedoms judgements, examines their consistency with past case law and, to 
a lesser extent, considers their implications for the legal culture.13 Beyond this is a 
relatively small body of socio-legal examinations of the broader significance of 
ECtHR religious freedom jurisprudence in terms of secularisation and the experience 
of religious minorities.14 There is very limited attention to impact at the national level 
                                                        
10 Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
11 Dia Anagnostou, The European Court of Human Rights: Implementing Strasbourg’s Judgments on 
Domestic Policy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
12 Laurence R. Helfer and Erik Voeten, 'International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence 
from LGBT Rights in Europe' International Organization Vol. 68 no. 1 (2014) 77–110. 
13 C. Evans (n. 8); Carolyn Evans and Christopher Thomas, 'Church-State Relations in the European 
Court of Human Rights' Brigham Young University Law Review, no. 3 (2006) 699–726; M. Evans (n. 
7); Paul M Taylor, Freedom of Religion UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice | Human 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
14 David Herbert and Max Fras, 'European Enlargement, Secularisation and Religious Re-Publicisation 
in Central and Eastern Europe' Religion State & Society, Vol 37 no. 1-2 (2009) 81–97; Haldun Gülalp, 
'Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights' European Public Law Vol. 16 no. 3 (2010) 455–
71; Koenig (n. 3); Dia Anagnostou, 'Does European Human Rights Law Matter? Implementation and 
Domestic Impact of Strasbourg Court Judgments on Minority-Related Policies' The International 
Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 14 no. 5 (2010) 721–43.  
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in terms of religion-state relations (e.g. Greece after Kokkinakis v. Greece15; Romania 
in the light of Moise case in Romania16; Turkey in light of Sahin v. Turkey17). But 
there is a lacuna in the scholarship as regards the influence of these judgements at the 
local and national level, in policy terms and more so in terms of their discursive 
impact. 
 
In the pages that follow I will elaborate a matrix of certain characteristics and 
mechanisms of the Court’s workings which render its decisions especially prone to 
such discursive impact. I will then offer an evolutionary perspective on the Court’s 
religious freedom jurisprudence which culminates in a focus on ways in which the 
Lautsi v. Italy case18 represents a critical moment in this evolution; references to the 
more recent cases of Sindicatul Păstorul v. Romania, Fernández Martínez v. Spain, 
and S.A.S. v. France19 reinforce the point. Lautsi also serves as an expedient entry                                                         
15Kokkinanis v. Greece, Application no. 14307/88, (ECtHR, 25 May 1993). For Kokkinakis v. Greece 
see Nikos Alivizatos, ‘A New Role for the Greek Church?’  Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 17 
no. 1 (1999) 23–40; John Anderson, ‘The Treatment of Religious Minorities in South-Eastern Europe: 
Greece and Bulgaria Compared' Religion, State & Society, Vol. 30 no. 1 (2002) 9–31; Effie Fokas, 
'Greece: Religion, Nation and European Identity' in H. Gülalp (ed) Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict, 
Challenging the Nation State (Routledge Press, 2006) 39–60; Effie Fokas, 'A New Role for the 
Church? Reassessing the Place of Religion in the Greek Public Sphere' Hellenic Observatory Papers 
on Greece and Southern Europe (GreeSE), Paper Series no. 17 (2008), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/GreeSE/GreeSE17.pdf; Kyriakos 
Kyriazopoulos, 'The Prevailing Religion in Greece: Its Meaning and Implications' Journal of Church 
and State, Vol. 43 no. 3 (2001) 511. 
16 Decision 323/2006, Romania's National Council for Combating Discrimination. See Liviu 
Andreescu and Gabriel Andreescu, 'Passive / Aggressive Symbols in the Public School: Religious 
Displays in the Council of Europe and the United States, with a Special Focus on Romania' in Jeroen 
Temperman (ed) The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public 
School Classroom (Brill Academic Publishers, 2012).  For Moise see further Gabriel Andreescu and 
Liviu Andreescu, '"The European Court of Human Rights" Lautsi Decision: Context, Contents, 
Consequences' Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, Vol. 9 no. 26 (2010) 47–74. 
17 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application no. 44774/98 (ECtHR, 10 November 2005). For Sahin v. Turkey 
see Haldun Gülalp, 'Religion on My Mind: Secularism, Christianity, and European Identity' in Haldun 
Gülalp and Günter Seufert (eds) Religion, Identity and Politics: Germany and Turkey in Interaction, 1 
edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2013) 164–79. 
18 Lautsi v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, (ECtHR, 27 July 2009 and 18 March 2011). The Chamber 
decision in the Lautsi case was issued in 2009, and the Grand Chamber decision in 2011; citations of 
the case henceforth reference these dates. 
19 Sindicatul ‘Păstorul cel bun’ v. Romania, Application no. 2330/09 (ECtHR 9 July 2013), Fernández 
Martínez v. Spain, Application no. 56030/07 (ECtHR 12 June 2014), S.A.S v. France, Application no. 
43835/11 (1 July 2014). 
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point for a discussion, in a third section, of the potential impact of grasstops 
mobilisations on religious pluralism. Then, with the help of American legal 
scholarship, I elaborate how grassroots level mobilisation is an important part of the 
story of the Court’s impact on religious pluralism in Europe. In a penultimate section I 
explore indirect, unintended and counterproductive effects we may find the Court will 
have on religious pluralism, when considering developments taking place ‘in the 
shadow’ of the Court. I close with reflections on how understanding such 
developments ‘in the shadow’ of the Court is critical to any conception of directions 
underway in religious pluralism in Europe.  
 
1. The Matrix: subsidiarity, the margin(s), consensus, and pluralism 
 
Key to this topic is what may be described as a matrix -- comprised of four principles 
or doctrines -- from within which the Court’s decisions elicit intense reactions at the 
local, national and international level. The principle of subsidiarity (in fact a religious-
origined – Roman Catholic – concept suggesting that a matter ought to be handled by 
the smallest, lowest, or least centralized authority capable of addressing the matter 
effectively), is a fundamental aspect of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 
the ECtHR context, the principle dictates that while certain standards must be 
universally observed by all Contracting States, each Contracting State is, in the first 
place, responsible for securing the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. 
According to Mancini, the Court developed the doctrine of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ in order to reconcile the potential tension between universality and 
subsidiarity.20 Through this doctrine the Court allows states a ‘margin’ in determining 
                                                        
20 Mancini (n. 6) 20–21. 
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whether a particular restriction of a right is required (‘necessary in a democratic 
society’) in the given circumstance.21 The doctrine, closely linked to the principle of 
subsidiarity, is based on the Court’s assumption that ‘By reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the 
exact content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or 
‘penalty’ intended to meet them’ (Handyside v. UK)22.  
 
In the religious freedoms context where, according to Evans,23 the margin tends to be 
particularly wide, the margin of appreciation is a substantial tool through which the 
Court allows states a certain, variable, leeway to interpret religious rights and 
freedoms within the broader context of their national cultures and traditions. 
Meanwhile, it provides an exit for the Court from certain culturally and politically 
sensitive issues: as Julie Ringelheim notes, ‘the large discretion [the Court] often 
grants to national authorities on [religion] cases is symptomatic of its difficulty in 
dealing with them’.24 By ‘them’ Ringelheim means the religion cases, but it could 
equally apply to the states and the Court’s difficulty in challenging existing religion-
state arrangements. 
 
In Rasmussen v. Denmark,25 the Court introduced the concept of consensus into its 
workings. Here the Court declared that ‘the scope of the margin of appreciation will 
vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background; in this 
respect, one of the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of common                                                         
21 C. Evans (n. 8) 142. 
22 Handyside v. United Kingdom, Application no. 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976). 
23 C.  Evans (n. 8) 143. 
24 Ringelheim (n. 4) 306. 
25 Rasmussen v. Denmark, Application no. 8777/79 (ECtHR, 28 November 1984). 
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ground between the law of the Contracting States’ (emphasis mine). According to 
Benvenisti, the consensus doctrine, coupled with the margin of appreciation doctrine, 
poses a serious obstacle to the protection of minority values: ‘In the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, consensus is inversely related to the margins doctrine: the less the court is 
able to identify a European-wide consensus on the treatment of a particular issue, the 
wider the margins the court is prepared to grant to the national institutions. Minority 
values, hardly reflected in national policies, are the main losers in this approach’26.  
 
Beyond opening the Court to criticism of moral relativism, the particular combination 
of the margin of appreciation and the consensus doctrine also leads to claims of 
double standards, as differential treatment of Islam has been noted.27 Richardson and 
Shoemaker make a similar argument about bias in Christian Orthodox cases.28 
According to one scholar, ‘In the mid-1990s, Lord Lester affirmed that the margin of 
appreciation “has become as slippery and elusive as an eel”. Now consensus, too, has 
become as slippery and elusive as the margin’.29 
 
The variable applications of the margin of appreciation by the Court on religious 
freedoms issues threaten to undermine, for many scholars (some of whom are cited 
above), but also for many publics, the Court’s commitment to pluralism and, 
ultimately, the legitimacy of the Court. Critically however, perspectives vary 
                                                        
26 Eyal Benvenisti, 'Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards'   International Law 
and Politics,Vol. 31 no. 4 (1999), 851. 
27 Gunn (n. 9); Tore Lindholm, 'The Strasbourg Court Dealing with Turkey and the Human Right to 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: An Assessment in Light of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey' in W. Cole Durham 
(eds) Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) 147–68. 
28 James T. Richardson and Jennifer Shoemaker, 'The European Court of Human Rights, minority 
religions, and the social construction of religious freedom' in Eileen Barker (ed) The Centrality of 
Religion in Social Life: Essays in Honour of James A. Beckford (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 
2010) 103–16. 
29 Paolo Ronchi, 'Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber Ruling in 
Lautsi v Italy'  Ecclesiastical Law Journal, Vol. 13  no. 03 (2011) 287-297, 296. 
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regarding on which side the Court errs – too much or too little activism in the area of 
religion; too narrow or too wide a margin, etc.; and normative statements abound. 
While the Court looks for consensus amongst contracting states on issues related to 
religion, there is a marked lack of consensus, amongst scholars and at the grasstops 
and grassroots level, regarding the Court’s handling of religious freedoms issues. One 
prominent critique is that the mandate of the Court is religious freedom, not religion 
in general, nor the place of religion in the public sphere. Thus also on trial is the 
extent to which the Court has a secularising agenda,30 or a selectively secularising one 
which still tends to protect majority Christian countries. 
 
Until relatively recently, the margin of appreciation and the subsidiarity principle 
were established through and embedded only in the Court’s case law. But as of 2013, 
both formally entered the European Convention of Human Rights with the 
introduction of Protocol 15, which inserts a reference to the principle of subsidiarity 
and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation into the Convention’s preamble. The 
latter development, critically, is to be seen as the result of grasstops mobilisations 
taking place linked to the reform process the Court has been undergoing, especially in 
the context of the Interlaken (February 2010), Izmir (April 2011) and Brighton (April 
2012) conferences on the future of the Court; the Brighton Declaration and the role of 
the UK government in urging for a more subsidiary role of the Court (during its 
Presidency of the Council of Europe, January – June 2012, but not only); and the on-
going consultation on the ‘longer-term future of the system of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights’ under the 
Council of Europe’s auspices.  
                                                        
30 Ringelheim, (n. 4); Koenig (n. 3); Evans (n. 7).   
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Certainly the aftermath of the reform process will significantly influence future 
religion-related cases and thus will feed into broader, Europe-wide discussions and 
developments around neutrality, pluralism and secularism, and religion in the public 
sphere. The latter point highlights the need for insight into the full process of the 
Court’s impact on religious pluralism in Europe: from developments at the grasstops 
which influence the decisions taken by the ECtHR; down through to the impact of 
these decisions at the grassroots level, on mobilisations taking place there ‘in the 
shadow’ of the Court’s decisions; and then, through the implications of these 
grassroots level developments for religious pluralism at the local and national level, 
back up to the supranational level via national and then ECtHR case law. A useful 
starting point for the latter process is an overview, albeit necessarily schematic, of the 
Court’s engagements with religion. 
 
 
2. The judicialisation of religion in the European Court of Human Rights 
In its first 34 years of operation as a Court, from 1959 to 1993, the ECtHR did not 
issue a single conviction against a state on the basis of the main religious freedom 
provision of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 on the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.31 Since that first ground-breaking case in 1993, 
                                                        
31 Notably, in the Court’s first 33 years (1959-1992), cases related to the right to religious freedom 
were dealt with exclusively by the European Commission of Human Rights and not by the Court (until 
the introduction of Protocol 11 in 1998, a two-tiered system was in place, with the European 
Commission of Human Rights filtering which cases would reach the Court. Protocol 11 abolished that 
Commission and allowed for direct access of individual applicants to the Court. As Ringelhem 
indicates in ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of Human Rights in Search 
of a Theory?’ (n. 4), until 1989 almost all cases brought under Art 9 were deemed inadmissible.  
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Kokkinakis v. Greece, the Court has issued over 50 Article 9 convictions. These 
numbers in themselves suggest a rapidly increasing judicialisation of religion.32 
 
Throughout the Court’s religious freedoms case law, the Court has increasingly dealt 
with issues going to the heart of religion-state relations and of the place of religion in 
the public sphere. The evolution is by no means linear, but certain trends can be 
detected. For example, Matthias Koenig33 observes a trend of the Court towards more 
narrow margins of appreciation and, effectively, towards more secularist 
approaches.34 Koenig sees a three-step evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence on 
matters of religion, leading increasingly to assertive secularist stances. The first step 
consists of a broad definition of religious freedom which tends to work in favour of 
majority religion over negative religious freedom claims – for example, the 
maintenance of asymmetric blasphemy laws as in the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut 
v. Austria35, where the Court defended the state’s right to seize and forfeit a film 
considered offensive to Christians.  
 
The second stage reflects a tendency of the Court to uphold secularism, mostly 
through cases to do with Islam. Characteristic here is the case of Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey, in which it upheld a ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf at Turkish 
universities.  
 
                                                        
32 Of course, not all religious freedoms cases are dealt with exclusively or even primarily under Article 
9 of the Convention: also highly relevant are Article 10 on Freedom of Expression; Article 11 on 
Freedom of Assembly and Association; Article 14 on Prohibition of Discrimination, Articles 1 and 2 of 
the first Protocol, on Property and Education, respectively. 
33 Koenig (n 3). 
34 Sylvie Langlaude, 'Indoctrination, Secularism, Religious Liberty, and the ECHR' International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 55 no. 04 (2006) 929–44.  
35 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Application no. 13470/87, (ECtHR 20 September 1994). 
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Finally, the third phase in ECtHR jurisprudence transposes the secularist line of 
argument in cases related to Islam, onto cases involving Christian majorities. In other 
words, in this latter stage, the Court may be seen not only as ceasing to protect 
majority religious rights but also actively influencing the status quo of church-state 
relations in signatory nations.36 
 
The Lautsi vs. Italy (2009) judgement is a case in point. Here through its reasoning the 
Court described the crucifix as a symbol which could ‘easily be interpreted by pupils 
of all ages as a religious sign’, which would result in them feeling ‘that they have 
been brought up in a school environment marked by a particular religion’. The latter, 
the Court argues, is problematic because ‘What may be encouraging for some 
religious pupils may be emotionally disturbing for pupils of other religions or those 
who profess no religion’.37 
 
The fact that Italy historically, culturally and institutionally is an ‘environment 
marked by a particular religion’ is a factor which prevailed in the Grand Chamber’s 
2011 reversal of that earlier Chamber judgement. For Julie Ringelheim, this dramatic, 
15-2, reversal represents yet another stage in the evolution of the Court’s religion case 
law, one backtracking to the Court’s earlier stance of ‘non-coercive neutrality’.38 
                                                        
36 Koenig (n. 3).  
37 Lautsi v. Italy (2009), para. 55.  
38 Ringelheim in  'Du Voile Au Crucifix: La Neutralité Confessionnelle de l’Etat Dans La 
Jurisprudence de La Cour Europeénne Des Droits de L’homme' in Actes Du Colloque Sur La 
Neutralité de l’Etat, vol. Acte du colloque sur la neutralité de l'État (Montreal: Montreal University 
Press, 2014) also describes a 3-stage evolution in the Court’s case law, when examined from the 
perspective of state neutrality: stage one is a period of ‘neutrality with non-coercion’ (e.g., Darby v. 
Sweden, 1989), stage two (in the 2000s, e.g., Folgero v. Norway, Application no. 15472/02 , 29 June 
2007), ‘neutrality without preference’, and stage three, beginning with the Grand Chamber decision in 
Lautsi v. Italy 2011, entails a return to the first stage of ‘neutrality with non-coercion’. For another 
evolutionary perspective on the case law, please see Marco Ventura, ‘Law and Religion Issues in 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg: the Virtues of European Courts’, Kick-off meeting Conference Paper, 
ReligioWest Project meeting, (November 2011), European University Institute. 
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The Lautsi case draws our attention convincingly to the importance of both grassroots 
and grasstops mobilisations ‘in the shadow’ of the Court’s religion case law. More 
than any other ruling on religion, the 2009 and 2011 Lautsi rulings brought the 
ECtHR to the mass level. L1 was momentous in terms of the breadth of its reach, 
potentially affecting every public school in a large number of member states, and on 
an issue that is highly emotive for many mass publics (e.g. the removal of crucifixes 
and icons). For many European nominal Christians, religious symbols in public spaces 
form an important part of their vicarious religion39: they may not use the symbols 
themselves or particularly pay attention to them, but they like them there, on the walls 
of public spaces, and certainly want to maintain their right to have them there. For 
many practicing Christians in Europe, religious symbols form a fundamental and 
active role in their expression and practice of their belief (as for the British Airways 
employee in whose favour the Court ruled, in her struggle for the right to wear a 
visible cross while at work, in Eweida and others vs. UK).40 In L2 the Grand Chamber 
judged that the crucifix in the classroom is seemingly harmless due to the passive 
nature of its presence.  
 
The Lautsi case, through both L1 and L2 and, critically, through the unprecedented 
interest in the case exemplified by the large number of third party interventions by 
national governments, MEPs, and NGOs representing religious, secular and atheistic 
ideologies, serves an example par excellence of the strong contestation of religious 
matters in the ECtHR jurisprudence. The Lautsi case is also suggestive of the extent to                                                         
39 Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe : A Memory Mutates: A Memory Mutates (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
40 Eweida and others vs. UK, Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 (ECtHR, 
15 January 2013). 
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which subsidiarity, the margin of appreciation and the consensus doctrine are at the 
centre of tensions between states, the Court, and religious pluralism.  
 
L1 threatened what was conceived by many as a national tradition, reflecting historical 
relations between religion and the state now embedded in national culture, and it 
applied an especially narrow margin of appreciation in not allowing the Italian state 
space to decide for itself whether the presence of the crucifix in the classroom entailed 
a limitation on Ms. Lautsi’s religious freedom (the freedom from religion interpreted 
in Art.2 of the first Protocol on the right to education in line with one’s own 
philosophical views). And L2, after a 2-year period marked by local, national, 
transnational and supranational mobilisations on the Lautsi case (elaborated below), 
entailed a return to a broad margin of appreciation.  
 
While L1 emphasised the state requirement of neutrality in relation to religion and 
suggested, following Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993), that pluralism is necessary for the 
preservation of a democratic society,41 L2 has been interpreted by some as a departure 
from the Court’s conception of state duty of neutrality and impartiality.42 As such, 
according to Liu, L2 raises the question as to whether states themselves ‘have been 
granted a “right” to manifest [their] religious beliefs’.43 
 
                                                        
41 ‘As enshrined in Article 9 (art. 9), freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a "democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious 
dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. 
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, 
depends on it.’ Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993, para 31. 
42 Hin-Yan Liu, 'The Meaning of Religious Symbols after the Grand Chamber Judgment in Lautsi v. 
Italy' Religion & Human Rights Vol.6 no. 3 (2011) 253–57; Ronchi (n. 28); Ringelheim (n. 37). 
43 Liu (n. 41) 254.  
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The implications are substantial. Post L2, and in the light of other major ECtHR cases 
on issues of religious freedom, are there trends reflecting conceptions of ‘national 
collective religious rights’ which can be pursued in the face of challenges to the status 
quo by religious, secular and ideological minorities? And can we see increasing 
tendencies of the Court to avoid religion-related convictions by recourse to the margin 
of appreciation? A brief consideration of the more recent cases of Sindicatul Păstorul 
v. Romania (2013), Fernández Martínez v. Spain (2014), and S.A.S. v. France (2014) 
suggests that the post-L2 world of ECtHR engagements with religion may indeed be 
somewhat altered. Each of these three religious freedoms judgements delivered after 
the Lautsi Grand Chamber judgement were decided in favour of the states in 
question44. And in each, the margin of appreciation factored significantly (see below). 
 
In Sindicatul Păstorul v. Romania (2013), the applicant - a union of a group of priests 
of the Romanian Orthodox Church who are seeking to form a trade union against the 
wishes of their ecclesiastical leaders - argued that the state’s refusal of its application 
for registration as a trade union infringed its members’ right to form a trade union, as 
guaranteed by Article 11 (on Freedom of Assembly and Association) of the 
Convention. Here the Court ‘shares the respondent Government’s view that in 
refusing to register the applicant union, the State was simply declining to become 
involved in the organisation and operation of the Romanian Orthodox Church, 
thereby observing its duty of neutrality under Article 9 of the Convention’45 and thus 
also respecting the principle of the autonomy of religious communities. Here one of 
the 3rd party interveners supported the Romanian government with the argument that                                                         44 The very interesting Vojnity v. Hungary case of course (Application no. 29617/07 [ECtHR 12 
February 2013], decided around the same timeframe as Sindicatul, Fernández, and S.A.S. cases, rules 
in favour the applicant, with the Court finding Vojnity has been discriminated against on the basis of 
religion.  
45 Sindicatul ‘Păstorul cel bun’ v. Romania, Application no. 2330/09 (ECtHR 9 July 2013), para.166. 
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‘Just as an individual must be absolutely free to organise her own beliefs, a church or 
other religious body must also be free to organise the people who personify its 
beliefs’. 46  
 
Similarly, support of religious autonomy, here too of the majority religion, is also 
found in the Court’s ruling in favour of the Spanish state in Fernández Martínez v. 
Spain (2014). In this case a teacher of Roman Catholic religion and ethics course in a 
state secondary school, a married priest, alleged that the non-renewal of his contract 
of employment as a school teacher entailed an infringement of Article 8 of the 
Convention (Right to respect for private and family life), taken separately and 
together with Article 14 (Prohibition of Discrimination).  Fernández Martínez argued 
that the cause of the non-renewal was the publicity given to his family and personal 
situation as a married priest, and thus the non-renewal conflicted with his rights to 
freedom of thought and freedom of expression under articles 9 and 10 of the 
Convention, respectively. Though the Court’s ruling supported the religious 
autonomy of the Spanish Catholic Church, this support is certainly far less absolute 
than in the Sindicatul case: Sindicatul was decided with an 11-6 majority; Fernández 
Martínez stands on the very shaky ground of a 9-8 split decision, with all 8 dissenting 
judges expressing their dissent in separate opinions (either jointly or individually).47 
 
                                                        
46 ‘Written comments of third-party interveners the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and the 
International Center for Law and Religion Studies’. Available online at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Sindicatul-v-Romania-brief1-FINAL.pdf. 
47 For commentary on the Fernández Martínez case, see Stijn Smet, ‘Fernández Martínez v. Spain: The 
Grand Chamber Putting the Brakes on the ‘Ministerial Exception’ for Europe?’, available online at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/06/23/fernandez-martinez-v-spain-the-grand-chamber-putting-
the-breaks-on-the-ministerial-exception-for-europe/, and Panagiota Emmanouilidou, ‘Balancing the 
autonomy of religious institutions with the right to a private and family life? 
A commentary on Fernández Martínez v. Spain’, ELIAMEP Briefing note 32/2014, available online at 
http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Briefing-Notes_32_July-2014_Panagiota-
Emmanouilidou-1.pdf. 
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Of these three more recent cases, S.A.S. v. France (2014) generated the most criticism 
of the Court, both raising new criticisms to do with the Court’s reasoning, and 
reinforcing old ones to do with differential treatment of Islam as a minority faith48. 
Here the Court ruled in favour of the French state, finding the French ban on the 
wearing of the full-face veil in public not in violation of Article 8 of the Convention 
(Right to respect for private and family life) or of Article 9 (Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion) (15-2 majority on both points), and not in violation of Article 
14 prohibiting discrimination, taken together with Article 8 or 9 (a unanimous finding 
on this point). The criticisms of the judgement’s reasoning focus especially on the 
Court’s acceptance of the promotion of ‘living together’ as a legitimate ground for the 
restriction of fundamental rights.49 ‘Living together’ (le ‘vivre ensemble’) is a concept 
employed in a French parliamentary report on the wearing of the full-face veil which 
is cited in the S.A.S. judgement, and wherein the practice of wearing the full-face veil 
is described as ‘at odds with the values of the Republic’, and specifically at odds with 
the concept of fraternity, ‘constituting the negation of contact with others and a 
flagrant infringement of the French principle of living together’.50 Five of the six 3rd 
party interventions were in support of the applicant; only the Belgian government 
intervened, unsurprisingly, on behalf of the French state. Whether, why and under 
what conditions third parties – governmental or non, religious or secular, acting 
independently or forming alliances – may influence the Court’s engagement with 
religion through mobilisations at the ‘grasstops’ level is a question worthy of careful 
consideration.                                                         
48 See Gunn (n.9) and also Françoise Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Church-State Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism’, Cardozo Law Review, Vol.30 no.6 (2009) 2575-
2591. 
49 See Eva Brems, ‘S.A.S. v France as a problematic precedent’, available online at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/09/s-a-s-v-france-as-a-problematic-precedent/. 50 S.A.S v. France, Application no. 43835/11 (1 July 2014), para 17. 
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3. Grasstops mobilisation and the ‘politics of the margin of appreciation’ 
 
The term ‘grasstops mobilisation’ encompasses a broad range of activity carried out 
by an equally broad spectrum of actors; here the term is used to indicate legal and 
political mobilisation which takes place at the national, international, European and 
transnational levels and which may be enacted by cause lawyers, judicial activists, 
NGOs, faith-based organisations (FBOs), political figures and national governments, 
and by transnational networks which may develop within and between the above 
groups, depending on their stakes in a given issue.51 The repertoire of activities may 
include petitions, demonstrations, lobbying of politicians and judges, legal activism, 
pressure on the Council of Europe for reform of the Court, etc. 
 
I return to the Lautsi v. Italy case here as it serves as an excellent example of 
grasstops mobilisation in the ECtHR context. In terms of transnational developments, 
quite notably it was a United States-based lawyer who represented eight of the ten 
intervening governments before the Grand Chamber in 2011; Annicchino52 describes 
a ‘holy alliance’ having developed between American conservative evangelicals, the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican in efforts to influence the final ruling.53    
 
                                                        
51 Dia Anagnostou, 'Law and Rights’ Claiming on Behalf of Minorities in the Multi-Level European 
System’' in Dia Anagnostou (ed) Rights in Pursuit of Social Change. Legal Mobilisation in the Multi-
Level European System (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 1–24. 
52 Pasquale Annicchino, 'Winning the Battle by Losing the War: The Lautsi Case and the Holy Alliance 
between American Conservative Evangelicals, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican to 
Reshape European Identity' Religion and Human Rights: An International Journal, Vol. 6 no.3 (2011) 
213–19. 
53 On transnational mobilisations in other areas of ECtHR litigation, see Dia Anagnostou 
‘Transnational Legal Mobilisation and State of Emergency’ in Dia Anagnostou (eds), Rights in Pursuit 
of Social Change. Legal Mobilisation in the Multi-Level European System, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2014), 157-180. Here Anagnostou traces the influence of Northern Irish litigation of states of 
emergency abuses on Kurdish cases against the Turkish state and, in time, the transposal of litigation 
patterns and mobilization strategies of both the latter onto Chechen cases against the Russian state. 
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Grasstops mobilisation is also exhibited in the Lautsi case through the ‘politics of the 
margin of appreciation’ played out at the national, international and European levels. 
L1 was a unanimous ruling of the 7-member chamber of the Court to which the case 
was assigned, finding that the display of the crucifix in Italian classrooms violates 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, which protects the parents’ right to educate their 
children in accordance with their own religious or philosophical beliefs. The Italian 
State sought and won a referral of the case to the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and an unprecedented number of states, associations, and 
individuals sought and won the right to intervene in the hearing with statements either 
for or against the original ruling. The interventions were in great majority against the 
2009 ruling: all of the ten intervening national governments,54 the 33 Members of the 
European Parliament, and four of the ten NGOs opposed the Court’s finding against 
the Italian state.55 
 
A detailed view of the arguments set forth by the national governments and the 
MEP’s offers us useful insight into the dimensions of national politics and the politics 
of sovereignty between contracting states and the Court. 8 of the 10 national 
governments,56 acting collectively, argued that the Chamber’s reasoning had been 
based on ‘a misunderstanding of the concept of “neutrality”, which the Chamber had 
confused with “secularism”, and that states should not have to ‘divest themselves of 
part of their cultural identity simply because that identity was of religious origin’.57 
The government of the principality of Monaco also argued that the Court should                                                         
54 Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, Romania and the 
Russian Federation. 
55 On third-party interventions, see also Laura van den Eynde, ‘An Empirical look at the Amicus 
Curiae practice of human rights NGOs before the European Court of Human rights’, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol.3 no.3 (2013) 271-313.  
56 Of the governments cited above (n. 46), Monaco and Romania issued separate interventions. 
57 Lautsi v. Italy, (ECtHR 2011), para. 47.  
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remain neutral and offered a definition of neutrality which hinges on the status quo: 
‘the principle of State neutrality require[s] the authorities to refrain from imposing a 
religious symbol where there ha[s] never been one and from withdrawing one that 
ha[s] always been there’.58 And the Romanian government argued that ‘the Chamber 
had taken insufficient account of the wide margin of appreciation available to the 
Contracting States where sensitive issues were involved and that there was no 
European-wide consensus’.59 For their part, the MEPs, acting collectively, argued that 
the Court must respect the principle of subsidiarity and recognise a ‘particularly broad 
margin of appreciation’ on religion-state relations: ‘a State which, for reasons 
deriving from its history or its tradition, show[s] a preference for a particular religion 
d[oes] not exceed that margin’.60 Issuing a warning about potential repercussions of a 
‘wrong’ judgement in L2, the MEP’s indicated that ‘by taking a decision whose effect 
would be to make it compulsory to remove religious symbols from State schools, the 
Grand Chamber would be sending a radical ideological message’ (L2, para 56). 61 
 
Also indicative of the ‘politics of the margin of appreciation’ is the fact that in the text 
of the L1 judgement, the margin of appreciation is mentioned only on three occasions, 
each time by the Italian government. But in the 2011 Grand Chamber judgement, the 
margin is mentioned 27 times in total, and eight times in the final paragraphs of 
assessment, which is indicative of the importance the margin is imparted in the 
Court’s overall reasoning.62 In the latter ruling the Court declares, ‘the fact that there 
is no European consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols in 
                                                        
58 ibid para. 48. 
59 ibid para. 49. 
60 ibid para. 56. 
61 id. 
62 Ronchi (n. 28). 
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State schools…speaks in favour of’ granting the Italian state a wide margin of 
appreciation. 63 
 
As noted above, the margin of appreciation also factored significantly in the 
Sindicatul, Fernández, and S.A.S. cases. There were nine references to the margin in 
Sindicatul, twelve in Fernández, and ten in S.A.S.; more often than not the word 
‘margin’ was preceded by ‘broad’, ‘wide’ or ‘wider’ in these references.  
 
Well before these particular cases arose, legal scholars presaged, in a way, the 
problems to arise around the margin of appreciation in its relation to subsidiarity and 
consensus in terms of politicisations and mobilisations around certain issues. In 1999 
Benvenisti writes,  
 
Given the importance of State sovereignty, the only way to impose on 
State parties newly evolving duties is by resorting to the notion of 
emerging custom, or ‘consensus’. By resorting to this device … [the 
Court’s] decisions reflect a respect of sovereignty, of the notion of 
subsidiarity, and of national democracy…One wonders to what extent 
it is really possible to envision credible threats by member States to 
challenge the court’s authority in reaction to unpopular judgements.64 
 
Likewise, post-L1 and pre-L2, Mancini65 notes that ‘the collective reputation of a 
court depends, to a large extent, on the audience at which its opinions are aimed. 
Judicial authority ultimately depends on the confidence of its citizens. If a court’s                                                         
63 Lautsi v. Italy (ECtHR 2011), para 70. 
64 Benvenisti (n. 25) 852. 
65 Mancini (n. 6) 26. 
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interpretations deeply differ from the convictions of the people, the people will start 
resisting judicial decisions’. This was clearly the case in Lautsi. This draws our 
attention more firmly to the grassroots level of the individual citizen. 
 
The extent to and the ways in which political and religious lobbying made a difference 
to the L2 decision is a matter that requires careful examination. Mancini explains that  
 
the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine, had so far 
protected the ECtHR from direct confrontations with contracting 
parties. The vituperative criticism directed at the European judges in 
the aftermath of the Lautsi decision indicates that a more active 
European court will not automatically be welcomed by the European 
peoples. …. If the European court, as the Lautsi case might suggest, 
abandons its traditional judicial self-restraint and becomes a true 
arbiter in highly divisive issues, such as religion, it will face many 
challenges. A crucial one will be to gain the confidence of European 
citizens, in order to avoid provoking populist resentments when 
establishing rights in a context of cultural controversy.66 
 
In general, states’ handling of religious matters (often) reflects grassroots level 
demands, expectations and mobilisations which, in turn, are (often) embedded in 
predominant conceptions of religion in relation to national identity and thus protected 
by the margin of appreciation. And all of the above is reflected back (or forward) into 
                                                        
66 ibid 26–27. 
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the Court’s handling of religion. We now turn our attention to mobilisations at the 
grassroots level. 
 
4. Grassroots mobilisations ‘at the margins’  
  
The ultimate influence of case law over the issues which it targets is much debated in 
legal scholarship, particularly in the American context. Applying the relevant 
literature to the European setting, do ECtHR judgements make a difference when it 
comes to religious pluralism on the ground? A court-centred approach to the question 
finds relatively little direct effect of case law on related practices. Within the context 
of a well-developed American legal scholarship on this question, Gerald Rosenberg 
(1991) argues that courts have little direct and independent impact on citizens’ 
behaviour and as such the notion that they can bring about social change is a ‘hollow 
hope’.67 The courts’ decisions are implemented in practice and can influence policy 
only as long as they find support among government decision-makers. In fact, based 
on comparative analysis Benvenisti contends that national courts’ case law tends to 
protect short-term governmental interests.68 Measured by such a direct standard, 
courts often appear to provide powerful support for the status quo but weak sources 
for challenging the prevailing order.69 As Malcolm Feeley puts it, ‘the conventional 
wisdom among political scientists and sociologists who have studied these matters is 
that the courts by themselves are not very powerful and, at best, are important at the 
                                                        
67 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? Second Edition, 
First Edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991). 
68  Benvenisti (n. 25) 
69 Michael McCann, 'Law and Social Movements' in Austin Sarat (ed) Blackwell Companion to Law 
and Society, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 507. 
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margins or in conjunction with other governmental bodies’.70 Adding to this point the 
fact that actual resort to judicial intervention is more the exception than the rule, the 
message one gleans is that courts are not always ‘where it’s at’: we need a closer look 
at the margins, and at local and national level developments on matters of religious 
pluralism.71 
 
A second approach, then, to the question of whether case law matters, is an adaptation 
of McCann’s theory on law and social movements and suggests instead an 
examination of what is happening in the aftermath of a law or judgement, at the 
grassroots level.72 This ‘decentered’ approach shifts attention from the direct effects 
of case law and recognises that court decisions can significantly facilitate the 
placement of issues on the public agenda and thus serve as catalysts for significant 
social change – what Scheingold calls the development of a ‘politics of rights’.73 
According to Scheingold, marginalised groups may capitalise on perceptions of 
entitlement associated with particular legal developments in order to initiate and to 
nurture political mobilisation. This process of ‘rights consciousness raising’, which 
takes place during the earliest phases of organisational and agenda formation, is, 
according to McCann ‘perhaps the most significant point at which law matters for 
many social movements’. 74 
 
                                                        
70 Malcolm M. Feeley, 'Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors' Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 17 no. 4 
(October 1, 1992), 751. 
71 Michael McCann, 'Reform Litigation on Trial Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 17 no. 4 (1992) 715 – 743. 
72 Michael McCann, 'Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives' Annual Review of Law 
and Social Sciences, Vol. 2 (2006) 17–38. 
73 Stuart A Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Political Change (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974). 
74 McCann (n. 61) 510. 
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McCann describes rights consciousness raising as comprising two separate processes 
of cognitive transformation amongst members of a movement: a) the process of  
‘agenda setting’, by which movement actors draw on legal discourses to ‘name’ and to 
challenge existing social wrongs or injustices; and b) case law can help define the 
overall ‘opportunity structure’ within which movements develop.75 To the first point, 
the proposed project adds the process of agenda setting whereby actors draw on 
ECtHR legal discourses to preserve the status quo (e.g., in the case of religious 
majorities which may use case law to maintain what other groups might consider 
‘existing social wrongs and injustices). As McCann notes,76 judicial victories can 
impart salience or legitimacy to general categories of claims, such as equal rights: in 
the post-Lautsi context, majority religious groups have in some cases sought to 
advance the argument that ‘majorities have rights too’.77 In the extent to which the 
interests of religious majorities coincide with those of the nation-state, then we have 
situations as described by Hin-Yan Liu, in which the claims of a right of member 
states parallel the individual right to thought, conscience and religion under Article 9 
of the Convention.78 
 
From this de-centred perspective which studies the local and national level grassroots 
mobilisations at the ‘margins’ of courts’ jurisprudence, actual compliance with a court 
ruling is only a small part of the possible policy consequences of any given court 
decision. General precedents set and specific legal ploys used, play an important role 
in delimiting the tactical options, opportunities, and resources available to citizens to 
                                                        
75 ibid 511. 
76 id. 
77 Effie Fokas, '"Eastern" Orthodoxy and "Western" Secularisation in Contemporary Europe (with 
Special Reference to the Case of Greece)'  Religion, State and Society, Vol. 40 no. 3–4 (2012) 395–
414. 
78 Liu (n. 41). 
 27 
seek change (or indeed, to seek to preserve the status quo). According to McCann, 
‘judicial opinions can reshape the strategic landscape in ways that encourage other 
citizens and officials to circumvent, defy, and even initiate counter-reform efforts to 
alter court rulings’.79 A bottom-up approach, then, includes attention to the various 
ways that reform activists deploy legal resources (e.g., discourses drawn from the 
Lautsi case Grand Chamber decision of 2011 by local and national level actors) to 
wage their campaigns in multiple venues including but also beyond courts.  
 
This is a dimension of movement activity which ‘requires the most complex, subtle, 
and unique reflections both about law and about social change’.80 Thus, in terms of the 
aftermath of ECtHR religious freedoms jurisprudence and the related grassroots level 
developments, a bottom-up, decentred approach to the Court’s influence is required, 
which will be sensitive to the variable, dynamic and interactive effects of knowledge 
and discourses communicated through the Court’s decisions, on a broad range of 
social actors and in a broad range of settings. It is here, in conversation with cause 
lawyers, NGO representatives, members of religious minority groups, etc., that we 
find unintended implications such as development of rights consciousness, which are 
amongst the least studied aspects of law and change. What rights consciousnesses 
might be developing in the aftermath of ECtHR cases of religious freedoms, and to 
what potential effects? Answers to these questions will yield important insight into the 
impact of the ECtHR’s case law on social perceptions and views concerning religious 
pluralism and religious freedom rights at the local and national level. 
 
                                                        
79 Michael W. McCann, 'Reform Litigation on Trial' Law & Social Inquiry Vol. 17 no. 4 (1992), 733. 
80 McCann, (n. 61) 518. 
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For example, in terms of public discourse, an examination of grassroots level 
developments can help us to understand whether religion and religious pluralism 
acquire greater public attention in the aftermath of particular judgements. In terms of 
the mobilisation and empowerment of religious and social actors, such a focus on 
developments ‘at the margins’ offers insight into whether religious and social actors 
gain, or lose, leverage as a result of the Court’s religious freedoms judgements. 
Finally, by studying the grassroots level we get a sense of the extent to which the aims 
of religious and social actors are articulated in terms which either echo or react against 
particular ECtHR judgements.  
 
 
5. In the shadow of the court: indirect, unexpected and/or counterproductive 
effects of the ECtHR on religious pluralism 
 
Well beyond the direct effects of the Court’s engagement with religion, in terms of the 
rights won or denied to the individual applicant and the penalty issued or not to the 
defendant state in question, as suggested above there is a whole other dimension of the 
Court’s engagement with religion and consequent impact on religious pluralism. This 
may be effectively described with the use of Marc Galanter’s term, ‘the radiating 
effects of courts’.81 Instead of a perspective focusing on the centripetal movement of 
cases into courts (as, for example, characterises much literature examining and 
critiquing the workings of the European Court of Human Rights and discussions of its 
reform required because of the heavy case load and large backlog of cases), Galanter 
                                                        
81 Galanter, 'The Radiating Effects of Courts,' in Keith O. Boyum and Lynn M. Mathe (eds) Empirical 
Theories about Courts (Longman, 1983) 117-142. 
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proposes a consideration of the centrifugal flow of influence outward from courts and 
into the wider world.  
 
Limiting our attention to ‘direct’ effects of the Court on religious pluralism (e.g., to 
decisions it takes related to religion and the implementation, or non, of those 
decisions) entails a drastic and imprudent narrowing of our purview of the Court’s 
influence. As Galanter notes,  
 
courts resolve by authoritative disposition only a small fraction of all 
disputes that are brought to their attention. These are only a small 
fraction of all disputes that might conceivably be brought to court and 
an even smaller fraction of the whole universe of disputes.82 
 
But the potential impact of courts on the ‘whole universe of disputes’ is much broader, 
if one considers the ‘radiating effects’ of courts. According to Galanter, the principal 
contribution of courts to dispute resolution is the provision of a background of norms 
and procedures against which negotiations and regulation take place in both private 
and governmental settings.83 Thus, widening our lens only slightly, we can begin to 
see courts as conferring on the parties engaged in a given case a ‘bargaining 
endowment’, e.g., a set of ‘counters’ to be used in bargaining between disputants. 
Courts supply standards and the setting for negotiations among the parties. The nature, 
extent, and results of such negotiations, taking place ‘in the shadow’ of European 
Court of Human Rights religious freedoms cases, are critical to an understanding of 
the fuller impact of the Court on religious pluralism.                                                         
82 ibid 119. 
83 ibid 121. 
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Galanter extends the notion of bargaining endowment to describe courts as conferring 
on disputants a ‘regulatory endowment’: ‘That is, what the courts might do (and the 
difficulty of getting them to do it) clothes with authorizations and immunities the 
regulatory activities of the school principal, the union officer, the arbitrator, the 
Commissioner of Baseball, and a host of others’ such as, in the case of ECtHR religion 
jurisprudence, the state, the religious association, the NGO, etc. 
 
Beyond bargaining and regulatory endowment, Galanter draws our attention to a host 
of other effects which flow from the activity of a court, which he categorizes as either 
‘special effects’ or ‘general effects’.84 Special effects are those produced by the impact 
of a court’s action on the parties before it. They include changes in the behaviour of 
the actors who are the subjects (or targets) of the application or enforcement of the 
law. For example, in Kokkinakis v. Greece, a special effect was a stop put on the 
imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witnesses by the Greek police forces. Other special effects 
are incapacitation, surveillance, special deterrence, reformation of the actors in a 
given case. In addition to, or instead of, changing one’s disposition towards the issue 
at hand, the experience of the court may also change one’s perceptions and evaluations 
of the activity of disputing about it, the institutions in which the disputes are processed 
(i.e. the Court), and of oneself as a disputant. Galanter offers the example of women 
winning in anti-discrimination cases who may still emerge disillusioned with the court 
and despair of vindicating their rights. Galanter labels these effects as claim 
encouragement and claim discouragement. These are all special effects of the courts. 
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General effects, on the other hand, are effects of the communication of information by 
or about the court’s action, and effects of the response to that information. These 
effects are, then, clearly of a broader nature and reach, affecting not only those 
immediately subject to the court but others as well. For example, communication of 
information about what was, or what could be, done by courts can lead to general 
deterrence. Deeper-rooted effects could take the form of enculturation – i.e., a change 
in the moral evaluation by individuals and groups of a specific mode of conduct, or 
normative validation, in the sense of a court decision serving to maintain or intensify 
already existing evaluations of a particular conduct. Another potential general effect of 
court decisions is facilitation: ‘legal applications may be taken neither as facts to be 
adapted to not norms to be adhered to, but as recipes to be followed. Using the law as 
a cookbook, we can learn how to bring about desired results – disposing of property, 
forming a partnership, securing a subsidy’.85 Finally, and as discussed above, court 
decisions may have mobilization and demobilization effects: they may encourage 
groups and individuals to invest in claims of a given type, providing symbols for 
rallying a group, and/or broadcasting awareness of grievance and dramatizing 
challenge to the status quo; or grievances may lose legitimacy, claims may be 
discouraged, and organizational capacity may be dissipated in the aftermath of a court 
decision. 
 
All of the above ‘general effects’ are enacted through transmission and reception of 
information, rather than by ‘concrete imposition of controls’ by a court. Critically, as 
Galanter notes, the information that induces the changes need not be accurate: ‘What 
the court has done may be inaccurately perceived; indeed, the court itself may have 
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inaccurately depicted what it has done’.86 One might expect that an examination of 
national level case law to be ripe with misreferences of ECtHR cases. And certainly 
the ECtHR has been faulted on many occasions of misrepresenting its own activities 
and decisions (conspicuously so on Islam-related cases but not only). 87 
 
From this perspective, the impact of courts on disputes is accomplished largely by the 
dissemination of information: ‘Courts produce not only decisions, but messages. These 
messages are resources that parties use in envisioning, devising, pursuing, negotiating, 
vindicating claims (and in avoiding, defending, and defeating them)’.88 The impact of 
these messages is largely contingent on who receives what messages from the Court, 
who is in a position to evaluate and process those messages, how he or she processes 
the information, and who is in a position to use that information.  
 
Galanter makes the key point that ‘just how potential disputants and regulators will 
draw on these resources is powerfully affected by their culture, their capabilities, and 
their relations with one another’.89 Thus inaccuracy in the transmission of the message 
is one variable. The plot thickens further when we consider the additional factor of 
variations in reception of the message: ‘a single judicial action may radiate different 
messages to different audiences’.90 And then we must also consider the competing 
messages already present in the space where the new court-origined messages land. 
Because of course, courts are not the only, nor are they the primary, sources of 
normative messages in a given society, or of controls in a given society: family, work 
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group, church, associations and networks of various forms, all of these make up what 
Galanter calls the ‘indigenous law’, or the ‘indigenous ordering’ of society.   
 
The latter entails a loud cry for contextualisation of any study of the radiating effects 
of the courts in general, and specifically regarding our purposes, a call for national 
and local case-study based approaches to the impact of the European Court of Human 
Rights religious freedoms case law on religious pluralism at the grassroots level. For 
example, in the aftermath of Lautsi v. Italy, 2009, a Greek Orthodox bishop in a 
Greek town, feeling certain the decision would be overturned, rallied his fellow 
Orthodox to start thinking of ways to ‘nationalise our religious symbols so we can 
protect them from Europe’. Thus an indirect, unexpected and in fact 
counterproductive effect of the Court was to encourage further nationalisation of an 
already nationalistic-tending church. That same Greek Orthodox Church actively 
engaged in grasstops mobilisations around the Lautsi Grand Chamber hearing. In a 
different cultural context, a Romanian humanist activist was encouraged in his case 
against the Romanian state for the presence of icons on public school classrooms, but 
his lawyers dropped his case in the aftermath of the 2011 Grand Chamber decision. 
And in Italy, since the 2009 Chamber decision, there have been three law proposals 
brought before the Italian Parliament to make the crucifix compulsory.91 The 
Northern League gathered signatures for a referendum and proposed to add a cross to 
the Italian flag. And several mayors bought and hung crucifixes, offered them to 
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citizens, and imposed sanctions against their removal from public spaces. 92 
 
Following Galanter’s conviction that any major advance in our understanding of how 
official legal regulation works depends on knowing more about indigenous law, any 
real understanding of the ECtHR’s impact on religious pluralism requires our 
understanding the extent to which its case law is known (e.g., ‘Lautsi awareness’ at 
the grassroots level), and how it is received, interpreted, reacted against, supported, 
etc., within the context of indigenous law in given national and cultural contexts.93 
And it is at this level we may expect to find a broad gamma of effects of the same 
ECtHR actions and decisions. 
 
6. Directions in religious pluralism 
 
Scholars have observed a general increase in the judicialisation of human rights as 
both individual and collective actors are more prone to seek redress, contest policies 
and pursue social reform through courts.94 The same applies for religious freedoms 
issues addressed by the European Court of Human Rights, which represent some the 
main debates in the European sociological and legal discussions around religion. The 
Court’s religious freedoms jurisprudence covers a strikingly contentious topical ambit: 
from religious symbols in public spaces (whether worn, as the headscarf, or on the 
wall, as in the crucifix), to whether a right not to be offended can be upheld through 
blasphemy or hate speech laws, and from abortion to same-sex marriage. Thus the                                                         
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Court has been addressing some of the most divisive and emotive social issues facing 
European societies. 
 
And in the process, the Court has been setting, from above, the parameters it would 
like to see for religious pluralism in Europe. This is amongst several reasons for the 
Court, as with many other European institutions, to be viewed by European citizens as 
non-transparent and distant from ‘the people’. This is in spite of the direct recourse 
citizens have to the Court: spontaneous litigation is increasingly rare and replaced by 
strategic litigation reflecting agendas which, again, may be far from the individual 
European citizen. Thus a focus on developments taking place ‘in the shadow’ of the 
European Court of Human Rights brings the influence of the Court on religious 
pluralism into sharp focus, but from the ground up.  
 
Can we detect a particular direction being taken in the Court’s influence on religious 
pluralism? For example, can we trace patterns towards an encouragement of pluralism 
through decisions promoting secularism as a form of neutrality? Or, alternatively, can 
we detect a trend towards acceptance of the various national and cultural approaches to 
religion, without passing judgement on the form of religion-state relations in a given 
case? 
 
I have argued here that, valuable though these questions are, they cannot be adequately 
addressed through a study of the Court’s case law. And this for at least two basic 
reasons. First, courts are not immune to social and political pressures. There are too 
many unpredictable influences from too many sources, grassroots and grasstops, to be 
able to suggest one direction in the courts’ handling of matters related to religion. 
 36 
Scholars either praising or condemning the European Court of Human Rights’ judicial 
activism in the religious domain, both groups seeing evolutionary trends in the 
direction of secularism which climaxed in the Lautsi v. Italy, 2009 decision, were 
given pause for thought with the 2011 Lautsi Grand Chamber decision. And this will 
likely be the case again and again over time as we seek to draw evolutionary charts of 
the Court’s engagements with religion. And second, as Marc Galanter emphasises, the 
effects of the courts also do not exist in a vacuum: they are contingent on how the 
court’s messages are received, interpreted, and used by potential actors which, in turn, 
is contingent on the information, experience, skill and resources that individual or 
collective actors bring to those messages.95  
 
Hence the emphasis on developments ‘in the shadow’ of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The shadow is where we find evidence of the fact that judicially 
articulated legal norms take a life of their own when deployed in social actions;96 and 
it is here that we can detect how the messages of the courts may be amplified, 
cancelled, or transformed by the presence of indigenous norms and controls, in ways 
that lie well beyond anticipation of the courts or the scholars studying them.97 Quite 
apart from offering scholars a more realistic sense of the multilevel and 
multidirectional influences of the Court on religious pluralism, such insight would also 
entail valuable feedback for the Court itself.  
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